Christo Grozev is Bellingcat's chief Russian investigator, focusing on security threats, covert operations outside the territory, and information weaponization. His investigation into the identity of the suspect in the Novijok poisoning case in the United Kingdom in 2018 won him and his team the European Investigative Journalism Award.
In the first part of this investigation, Bellingcat and The Insider reported on Russian interference in the October 2014 parliamentary elections of the Republika Srpska. In Part 2, we investigated the possible involvement of Russia in the suspected attempted coup after the parliamentary elections in October 2016 in Montenegro.
On July 14, 2016, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a series of messages threatening the Republic of Montenegro on Twitter:
#Zakharova: We took note of the statement on “Russian propaganda” issued by the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, on July 12
— MFA Russia?? (@mfa_russia) July 14, 2016
#Zakharova: The current Montenegrin authorities will take full responsibility for the consequences of their anti-Russian stance @AmbRusME
— MFA Russia?? (@mfa_russia) July 14, 2016
These vague threats came from Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to the Montenegrin Prime Minister’s statement that “the lowest class in the Balkans became the victims of Russian propaganda”. In turn, in the months after Montenegro decided to move west and accepted NATO’s invitation to join the alliance, Russia’s increasingly hostile rhetoric contributed to this statement-a political decision that is controversial from a popular point of view. (Between 40% and half of the population) is estimated to oppose joining the military alliance).
On December 2, 2015, Kremlin spokesman Peskov threatened that if Montenegro joined NATO, Russia would take "retaliatory measures" and the Russian parliament threatened to freeze all cooperation projects with this small Balkan country. Zhukanovic ignored these Russian warnings and signed an accession agreement with NATO in May 2016, permanently depriving Russia of the only potential ally with a navy access to the Mediterranean.
Despite all the warning signals, on October 16, 2016-Montenegro's general election day-Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic announced that the special service of the Republic had arrested 20 Serbian citizens the day before. Has been plotting a paramilitary conspiracy to plunge the Mountain Republic into chaos-and may allow him to be assassinated. The global response is skeptical. In the next few days, prosecutors, ministers, and local media described the so-called conspiracy in contradictory ways, which sounded too cartoon to report seriously. Authorities claim that under foreign guidance, two dozen Serb and Montenegrin conspirators conspired to buy weapons, sneak into parliament as police officers on election day, launch fake police attacks on protesters gathered outside the building, and arrest—or possibly even Assassinate the prime minister and establish a government led by the Democratic Front-a resolutely anti-NATO and pro-Russian opposition alliance. This story hardly appeared in the global news stream.
It wasn't until Serbia-initially as skeptical of the Montenegrin government's claims-that two Russian citizens were arrested on October 24-Serbian police said-they had fake Montenegrin special police uniforms, a cache of 122,000 euros, and complexities. Encrypted telecommunications equipment-global media began to pay attention to this story. On October 26, 2016, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev (Nikolai Patrushev) went to Belgrade for the original visit. In early November, the Guardian quoted an undisclosed source close to the Serbian government as saying that Patrushev had apologized to the Serbian government for what he called "unapproved hooliganism", which Russia later publicly denied. This statement is also called a provocation.
A few days after Patrushev’s visit, on October 29, the Serbian police found a batch of weapons near the home of Prime Minister Vucic in Jajinci, along the route where he was going to work on horseback. The arsenal was hidden in a car parked in a forest about fifteen meters from the roadside. It included a grenade launcher, four grenades and more than one hundred rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, as well as automatic weapons ammunition.
This surprising discovery kept Vucic in hiding until the end of the investigation. The reaction of countries that have seen a prime minister killed by a sniper in 2003 is understandable. In a written statement to the media, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dacic suggested that the planners of the attempted assassination might be powers from abroad and were dissatisfied with Serbia's sovereign choice. Dacic wrote: "History has proven that it is always possible to hire Serbs to do their dirty work."
At the press conference the next day, Vucic downplayed the weapon discovery as an imminent sign of an assassination conspiracy, but said that he had received warnings and threats a few days ago, and confirmed that investigators suspected ties to foreign countries, but said that the threat "no It is as specific and proven as the coup attempt in Montenegro." Vucic confirmed that he "saw and heard conclusive evidence" in support of the Montenegrin prosecutor's allegations. "I heard the conversation with my own ears; I am not satisfied with the report card, I want to listen to it with my own ears. Only after I listened, did I dare to confirm this to you." Wu Qiqi said.
The next day, on the evening of November 1, 2016, the Serbian police tracked down the hiding place and found a "Heckler & Koch" automatic gun loaded with ammunition and 200 grams of TNT, a mobile phone paired with a detonator, and a pistol. These weapons were stored in In the trunk of a stolen Renault Megan, the car is parked in a garage in New Belgrade.
In the next few days, the Serbian media released passive news, stating that after Patrushev visited Belgrade, two Russian citizens were deported to Russia.
At the first press conference since the defeat of the coup was announced on October 16, on November 6, the Chief Special Attorney of Montenegro, Milivoje Katnic, provided details of the alleged conspiracy. According to his narrative, the plot involved citizens of Serbia, Russia and Montenegro, and its goal was to change the political system of Montenegro.
He said that the plan was planned by two Russian nationals who recruited a Serbian national-now a main accused defendant-as the main organizer of the conspiracy. Through him, more Serbian and Montenegrin nationals were recruited, with the goal of recruiting up to 500 people by the election date.
Katnić said the plan was to allow dozens of conspirators to infiltrate the protesting crowd in front of the parliament building after 23:00 on election night. Then a certain politician from a certain political group (later defined as the anti-NATO, pro-Russian Democratic Front) took the stage and triggered the masses and terrorists to attack the parliament with force. The infiltrated crowd will maintain control of the building for 48 hours, while the gunman will aim to assassinate Prime Minister Zhukanovic. The ultimate result of the conspiracy will be to change Montenegro’s political course and prevent it from joining NATO.
Katnik said that a core group of 50 armed and well-trained terrorists has been recruited from Montenegro, Serbia and Russia. These terrorists have "military experience in fighting in a third country." He refused to explicitly confirm whether this refers to eastern Ukraine. The criminal group obtained fifty automatic rifles and fifty pistols.
The prosecutor produced a three-minute video provided by the Serbian authorities, showing a large number of riot police equipment, Topcom and Motorola communications equipment, pepper spray, truncheons, gas masks, barbed wire and drones; all of them were allegedly detained. Owned by planners detained in Serbia at the request of Montenegro.
Katnik told reporters that the two Russians have been arrested by the Serbian special prosecutor and secretly monitored by Serbian agents. Therefore, they "cannot use evidence in court" and therefore "cannot detain them." "The two have left Serbian territory. He said he did not specify whether they were in Russia.
The special prosecutor carefully separated Russia as a country against alleged Russian nationals. "We believe this is the work of Russian nationalists who want to prevent Montenegro's Euro-Atlantic integration. We are cooperating with Serbia and Russia on this case," he said.
However, after it was discovered that one of the two Russians searched by the Interpol Red Notice Alert System in Montenegro was travelling with a false surname in the officially issued new Russian passport, Montenegro's position on the intervention of the Russian government changed. In addition, it is understood that Eduard Shishmakov (Eduard Shishmakov) only recently served as the deputy military attache of the Russian Embassy in Warsaw. According to the former head of government of another Balkan country familiar with the matter (talking to us on the condition of anonymity), the prime ministers of Serbia and Montenegro initially accepted Patrushev’s assurance that these actions are not related to the country. On the surface, at least one of the GRU-related findings of the Russian nationalists’ actions is shocking.
Russia denied these allegations and rejected Montenegro’s request to extradite wanted Russian citizens. On March 2, 2017, Montenegro asked Russia to provide official legal assistance to allow Russian citizens to be interrogated on Russian territory in the presence of Russian and Montenegrin prosecutors. As of press time, Russia's response to this request is still awaiting.
The Montenegrin prosecutor’s narrative is mainly based on witness statements provided by two participants in the self-confessed conspiracy: Mirko Velimirovic, a Montenegrin national, who surrendered and became a police informant four to five days before October 16, and Alexander Sindjelic, a former Serbian The criminal, who had been on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine, was the leader of a staunch anti-NATO, pan-Slavist, and pro-Kremlin paramilitary organization Serbian Wolves.
Sindjelic was initially detained in Serbia because Velimirovic’s testimony alleged that he was his recruiter to buy weapons and participate in the takeover of the parliament building on election night. After testifying to the Serbian prosecutor on November 6, Sinjelic agreed to be transferred to Montenegro to testify under the promise of a “protected witness” agreement with the Serbian and Montenegrin prosecutors. On November 22, the Montenegrin High Criminal Court approved the suspension of his criminal responsibility in exchange for testimony against his suspected handlers.
Before Montenegro was prosecuted, Sinjelic recalled that he was recruited by Russian citizens who he believed were working for special services. He in turn hired the former Serbian special police chief Bratislav Dikic. The two organized a criminal syndicate and prepared for a riot after the Montenegrin elections on October 16th. Eventually they planned to assassinate Prime Minister Zhukanovic and forcibly seize Montenegro. regime.
Sindjelic also recruited a Montenegrin contact, Miro Velimirovic, to buy weapons from Kosovo and recruit more local coup participants. When Velimirovic expected to deliver the weapons, he had already cooperated with the police and was instructed to report to Sindjelic and Shishmakov that the weapons had been purchased. Shishmakov then asked for photos of the weapons as evidence. The prosecutor borrowed a weapon from the Montenegrin police to take a photo and sent a photo to Shishmakov. At the last moment, Sinjelic felt strange and decided to replace Velimirovic with Dickic as the main field organizer. Velimirovich had to hand over the encrypted phone call to Dickic, who went to the safe house by phone, where he was told where the weapon was stored. The Montenegrin police waited there and detained him.
According to Sinjelic’s testimony, the Montenegrin prosecutors accused the two leaders of the anti-NATO and pro-Russian Democratic Front, Andrea Mandic and Mladen Knezevic, as complicit in preparing for the coup, and planned to participate in the election. Night moves with the planners and will become the ultimate beneficiary of the coup. The special prosecutor demanded that they be deprived of parliamentary immunity and prosecuted. Mandic and Knezevic denied any connection or knowledge of the planned coup, and challenged Sindjelic as a provocateur acting on behalf of his political enemy Djukanovic. Although earlier agreed to face Sinjelic in a witness standoff, both refused to meet with him on March 20, 2017, on the grounds that more time was needed to prepare.
The Democratic Front, Bratislava Dickic and the leaders of the Kremlin all condemned the Montenegrin narrative as a fabrication to discredit the opposition and consolidate the political power of Milo Djukanovic. Some Serbian and Montenegrin commentators also expressed doubts about the official version. The key line of attack is that the prosecutors in Montenegro did not produce evidence of the weapons allegedly seized, nor did they have conclusive evidence linking the opposition to the conspiracy.
Bellingcat and The Insider analyzed all currently available open source data to evaluate Montenegro’s claims that Russia (the country) participated in the so-called coup, to evaluate the rationality of the events described in the Montenegrin narrative, and to further determine the entities that Russia may be involved in. The purpose of this investigation is not to provide a conclusive assessment of all the facts claimed by the Montenegrin authorities; its focus is to assess the possibility of Russia’s effective intervention in Montenegro’s domestic politics in the context of a broader review of Russia’s active measures in southern Europe.
Sindjelic claimed that he was initially approached by “Russian nationalists” who he encountered while fighting on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and 2015. He was invited to Moscow to meet representatives of "Special Services". Sindjelic said that his travel was arranged and paid for by Eduard Shirokov, whom he knew. He met him at the arrival gate of Moscow Airport and arranged for him to bypass the passport control at Moscow Airport to avoid leaving evidence of Sindjelic's existence in Russia.
On September 26, at a meeting in a "luxury apartment" in Moscow, Snyelić said that he met Shirokov and another Russian, Vladimir Popov. They provided him with the opportunity to participate in the plan to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO-a concept that appealed to him ideologically because he had been engaged in pro-Russian and anti-Western political activities for many years. During the meeting, Shirokov showed Sidnelic the detailed architectural plan of the Podgorica Parliament Building and outlined plans for entry and takeover on election night. Then he ordered him to buy weapons and ammunition, and he provided funds for this, initially in cash, and then transferred via Western Union.
After returning to Belgrade, Sinjelic said that he contacted and recruited Velimirovic to purchase weapons from Kosovo and rented a house in Podgorica for the conspirators to store and serve as a safe house. Sindjelic stated that this gave Velimitovic 25,000 euros in cash and three boxes of ammunition.
Both Sindjelic and Velimirovic testified that Shirokov and Popov arrived in Serbia in early October and provided an encrypted Lenovo phone with a pre-programmed number to Sindjelic, who gave one of them to Velimirovic. According to reports, police sources revealed to Montenegrin media that Lenovo's mobile phones were purchased online from a website in Bulgaria.
Sindjelic claimed that he and Dikic further recruited Nemanja Ristic, a former criminal from Serbia, who also traveled to eastern Ukraine and fought there.
Nemanja Ristic supports Serbian nationalist politicians and Bratislava Dickic at the anti-NATO rally in Belgrade
Nemanja Ristic takes a selfie with Lavrov in Belgrade, December 2016
Sindjelic said that through an encrypted VOIP phone, he conveyed instructions to Velimirovic and Dikic to sneak into the parliament building at the end of the election day. He was dressed as a policeman but wore a blue ribbon as an identifier for their accomplices. They will look forward to further instructions based on the election results.
The open source data is not contradictory, although it does not necessarily prove Sindjelic's version of the incident.
As shown in his social media accounts (mainly on the Russian social network VK), since at least 2013, Sinjelic has been a strong opponent of NATO, EU, and Western concepts. His social network is full of anti-American, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-EU images made in Russia, as well as posts showing praise for Vladimir Putin. He runs an online radio station dedicated to these same values.
Sindjelic did travel to Crimea in early 2014 as part of a checkpoint sent by Serbian volunteers a few days before the "referendum"; he did travel to Donbass in early 2015. In a Skype video conversation on March 11, 2015, his colleague leaked in the chat and saw Sinjelic boasting about going to Moscow to meet with "important figures in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." “Defense” discussed the case of Serbian Chetnik leader Zivković (who seems to be wanted by GRU for unknown reasons). It was further seen that he asked for “more cash,” but his counterpart in Belgrade, Serbian Political Science The family told him that "after the Crimea situation", this would be difficult to arrange.
An analysis of Sindjelic's VK timeline shows that he is an avid poster or reposter, posting an average of 7-8 posts per week. On September 25, 2016, the day he allegedly met with Shishmakov and Popov in Moscow, he posted a selfie at an unknown location. Due to the common internal background, the photos cannot be geolocated.
It’s worth noting that after this post, Sinjelic didn’t publish anything until October 20, 2016, when he reposted a general pro-Russian message (On October 20, Sinjelic was still at large , And was hunted down by Montenegro and Serbian police). The four weeks of social media silence is inconsistent with Sindjelic's previous online behavior, but consistent with the period of working on projects that require full attention and minimal traceability.
On October 19, 2016, the Montenegrin newspaper Dnevne Novine and several news websites obtained leaked transcripts and recordings of alleged calls between Sinjelic and Dickic (transcripts only) and between Sinjelic and Velimirovich (Transcript and audio).
The phone call between Sindjelic and Velimirovic appeared to be the day before the election date. During the phone call, Velimirovic expressed his concern that he had not received clear instructions on the expected course of events the next day, and complained that he has not yet met with people who should provide such instructions. The translated audio call is as follows:
The voice comparison between Sindjelic's voice in this call and his (authenticated) voice in the Skype video call confirms that the person in the call is indeed Sindjelic. The balance of audio level and bandwidth means that the recording device/application is on the phone that initiated the call, namely Velimirovic. This is consistent with the prosecution's statement that at the assumed time, Velimirovic was already a police informant.
Records of the call between Sindjelic and Dikic indicate that it ostensibly took place the day before the election date. On the phone, Dikic complained that he could not reach the phone by phone. According to Sindjelic, his phone was roaming. Dickic will sneak into the parliament dressed as a policeman and wait for the election results. If the opposition Democratic Front wins, or if Zhukanovic voluntarily relinquishes power (calling on the parties seems to wish to do so), he will not take action (the actual result) . They mentioned "politicians" who appeared to be part of the plan. The call also explicitly mentioned "Russians".
We have talked with the political editor of Dnevne Novine, who obtained the transcript, and he insisted on the credibility of his source. It is worth noting that although Dickic’s lawyer did not verify the authenticity of the transcript, he accused the prosecutor of allowing "indiscretion to the media", thereby indirectly increasing the credibility of the content.
The leaked transcripts were not certified by the Montenegrin authorities, and the Minister of the Interior hinted that they may be part of a distraction activity. This may be a sincere warning, but it may also be the result of concerns about actual leaks of ongoing investigations, especially when the nature of the foreign (Russian) link is still undetermined.
The content of the transcripts tallies with Sindjelic and Velimirovich's testimony to prosecutors that in case electoral victory was claimed by the ruling party, a separate group of conspirators, mingled with the crowd of expected protestors, would trigger a storming of the Parliament building. According to Limirovic’s testimony, his fake police team would then react by shooting at the crowd, causing confusion and encouraging the crowd to take over the building and creating conditions for members of the Democratic Front to take over power.
Eduard Shishmakov took a Russian passport to Serbia in the name of Eduard Shirokov, and Montenegro issued a red alert through Interpol. On February 19, 2017, the Montenegrin Special Prosecutor announced that Shirokov's real name was Shismakov, which was discovered through a prompt received from the Polish Partner Service.
Copies of two simultaneously valid passports issued to the same person appear to use two different surnames. It is worth noting that this passport called Shirokov was issued in August 2016, one month before the so-called Moscow recruitment conference. The authentic Shishmakov passport was issued in 2012.
We have confirmed that Eduard Shishmakov is indeed the real name of the person wanted by Interpol. Shishmakov was born into a family of military officers in 1971 and completed high school in a Soviet military base school in Halle, East Germany. In 1993, he graduated "with honors" from the Black Sea Military Naval Academy in Sevastopol.
Excerpt from the 1993 Military Naval Academy graduation roster showing Shishmakov under #310
After graduating from the Naval Academy, he studied at the Military Diplomacy Academy of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which is a military attache training institution, and the GRU intelligence officer school that operates under diplomatic cover. Shishmakov’s classmates include Igor Kostyukov, the first deputy director of the GRU, and Sergey Zapadaev, the commander of the military intelligence unit 62986. Ukraine considers him to be a key GRU participant in Russia’s intervention in eastern Ukraine.
As of 2013, Shishmakov served as a naval attache at the Russian Embassy in Warsaw. On January 24, 2014, Shishmakov participated in a high-level security meeting with the Polish Security Council (BBN). On the Russian side, Yevgeny Lukyanov (Nikolai Patrushev’s deputy), deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Grigory Tischenko, director of defense research at the Kremlin’s Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Attended the meeting. The Russian version of the report of the meeting of the Russian Security Council omitted Shishmakov's name.
In November 2014, Polish media reported that a Russian diplomat was declared unwelcome and expelled. In March 2017, Polish authorities confirmed to Sky News that the diplomat was Edward Shishmakov. The Russian Embassy in Poland did not remove Shishmakov from the list of embassy officials. This is a standard intelligence practice used to disguise the identity of outbound spies.
Edward Shishmakov (right) at an event commemorating the victory of the Soviet army over Nazi Germany, Poland, March 2014
Shishmakov was accused by the Polish military counterintelligence of recruiting a Polish military officer, Lieutenant Colonel Zbigniew J, who worked in the Ministry of Defense. According to a court ruling in May 2016, the Polish military officer was sentenced to eight years in prison. His task was to provide GRU data to hundreds of Polish military personnel with a history of misdemeanor, criminal prosecution or other disciplinary issues. These are considered more likely to be recruited as spies. The colonel admitted in court that he had received a payment of 17,000 zloty (5,500 euros) and received a special encrypted phone to contact Shishmakov.
At the same time, in October 2014, a Polish-Russian lawyer Stanisław Sz was arrested and prosecuted for supporting the economic espionage of the Russian GRU. According to his indictment, he was recruited and handled by the same GRU officer as Lieutenant Colonel Zbigniew J, so it may be Eduard Shishmakov.
Polish special police arrested Colonel Zbigniew S., October 17, 2014
Eduard Shishmakov had a social media account on the Russian social network Vkontake (VK); the account was deleted sometime in late 2016. We were able to identify his deleted account among Dmitriy Shishmakov's friends. His father is Eduardovich, which suggests that this may be his son. Dmitry Shismakov is an IT entrepreneur from St. Petersburg.
Eduard Shishmakov has a listed residential address in St. Petersburg. According to our sources, this address belongs to a company apartment owned by GRU.
Located in the GRU apartment complex in Pavlovsk, St. Petersburg, Shishmakov’s official residence.
Dmitriy Shishmakov refused to answer our questions about his relationship with Eduard Shishmakov and the scope of the latter’s activities, and denied that he was even connected with Eduard Shishmakov, wanted by Interpol. However, as evidenced by this photo of the two and the visual similarity between the young Edward Shishmakov and the young adult Dmitry, there is no doubt that he and the GRU officer Shishma Cove related.
Dmitriy Shishmakov was visiting Poland when Eduard Shishmakov was a naval attaché, from the interview he posted on his Facebook timeline in June 2014 It can be seen in the photos of Krakow.
After we tried to interview him, Dmitriy Shishmakov deleted this photo and all photos of his visit to Poland from his timeline.
Eduard Shishmakov's cell phone number has been closed since his identity was disclosed in mid-February. His home phone rang, but no one answered it.
The prosecutor did not clearly describe Popov’s role if it is separate from Shishmakov’s role. He was described as one of two Russians recruiting Sinjelic in Moscow. It is speculated that he went to Serbia in October 2016 because the Montenegrin authorities could obtain his passport photos used for the Interpol arrest warrant.
We cannot confirm Popov’s background and/or education, and whether this is indeed his real name. However, a social network account with the same name and birthday has always existed on VK until it was deleted on March 4. However, the independent Russian news website MediaZona retrieved a photo of the account holder, which is very similar to the Interpol photo.
A previous review of Popov’s timeline revealed that he frequently traveled and posted from Europe, including Germany, Switzerland, Georgia, Turkey, and Greece. He appears to have participated in several international conferences on the subject of marine insurance, and his account claims that he worked for the now-defunct marine insurance publication.
A Moldovan publication claimed that the Moldovan security services tracked a person with the same name and date of birth during a visit to the country in May/June 2014, where he met with Gagauzi separatists and anti-EU activists. As of press time, the Moldovan National Security Agency has not yet responded to our request for confirmation.
A source from the Bulgarian border control agency confirmed to us that on October 10, 2016, a person with the same full name and nationality on a Schengen visa was registered as entering or leaving Bulgaria.
There is no doubt that Edward Shishmakov was in Serbia in October 2016 because the Serbian and/or Montenegrin authorities can use the newly-issued passport he submitted to Interpol in October 2016.
There is no doubt that Edward Shishmakov was serving in the GRU when he was expelled from Poland in October 2014. After his visit as a Russian spy, he is unlikely to travel under his real name without surveillance by a Polish partner agency. According to him using an alias to obtain a new passport (the Russian law does not allow civilians to use it), Shishmakov is highly unlikely to leave the GRU service in August 2016. This fact is indirectly supported by his current registered address for the residence owned by GRU.
His previous modus operandi in Poland, especially his (or GRU) tendency to recruit targets with felony backgrounds, and his communication methods seem to be consistent with the so-called methods used in Serbia and Montenegro.
In addition, in August 2016, two months before the trip to the Balkans on the eve of the Montenegrin elections, a passport with a pseudonym was issued, further confirming the hypothesis that Shishmakov was performing a GRU mission aimed at interfering in the elections in Montenegro. . .
There is less conclusive evidence that Vladimir Popov has a connection with the Russian intelligence services. His role, if any, is likely to be smaller than Shishmakov. His trip to Bulgaria may be related to the delivery of encrypted phones. According to a Montenegrin media investigation, these phones were purchased through the Bulgarian website.
As we wrote in Part 1 of this survey, after his successful paramilitary intervention in eastern Ukraine, the Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev (Konstantin Malofeev) had a brief pan-European ADHD China revels in being a denial agent of the Russian state. According to multiple sources, at the end of 2014, the Kremlin restricted his geopolitical agency to the Balkans.
During the 2014-2016 period, Malofiev, in addition to intervening in the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was also related to Greek media acquisitions and political engineering; he tried to take over Bulgaria’s strategic media, weapons manufacturing and telecommunications companies, with the aim of using them to sponsor a new company. Pro-Russian parties; and the acquisition of a large media group in Serbia. In pursuing his regional strategy, Malofiev worked closely with the Kremlin’s quasi-academic think tank RISS, which until recently was led by General Reshetnikov, a former KGB resident in the Balkans. So far, RISS and Malofeev are at least related to the joint political project of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece and Bulgaria.
In view of the role of the regional firewall assigned to Malofiev by the Kremlin, it is impossible for the Russian intelligence services to directly fund and implement any active measures without his mediation, especially those with the potential for political coups to counterattack.
The recent email and VK hacks by Alexander Usovskiy, who freelanced Malofeev's active measures in Central and Eastern Europe in 2014 and 2015, seem to provide circumstantial evidence that the Russian oligarchs did participate in the failed Montenegrin coup. In a series of emails and Facebook messages, Usovskiy seemed convinced that Malofeev was behind the "unnecessary Montenegrin fiasco." In an email to Malofeev's close partner and TV Tsargrad chairman Alena Sharoykina on November 28, 2016, Usovskiy bluntly proposed a new initiative that would wash off the eggs on his face after Montenegro's failure.
"The email in the attachment is what I can guarantee in Poland. It is legal, legal and very fast. There is no conspiracy theory, and it is completely within the scope of the law. However, the impact of this measure will be part of the failed chaotic situation in Montenegro. A hundred times. Seven weeks. From the moment the funds are allocated until the explosion of the information bomb. After that, no one will remember KV [The acronym of Konstantin Valereevich Malofeev] As the Montenegrin adventure fails-everyone will remember He is the comforter of Poland and the one who took the first step on the road to destroying Poland’s phobia. This is not a joke.”
Alena Sharoykina did not respond to Usovsky's proposal. She declined to answer Bellingcat's written questions about the email and its context.
From September 10 to 11, 2014, at an international gathering dedicated to "traditional family values" sponsored by Malofiev in Moscow, the billionaire hosted a Montenegrin parliament who is known for his anti-NATO stance Strahinja Bulajic. A few months later, Brajic became a member of the leadership of the Democratic Front Alliance. Throughout 2015 and 2016, Brajic initiated and organized protests against the "NATO Mafia" and called on Zhukanovic to resign. Throughout 2016, Malofeev's Tsargrad TV station provided DF leaders Andria Mandic and Milan Knezevich (both currently the main suspects in the so-called Montenegrin coup) with a large amount of broadcast time. In a Tsargrad TV interview in February 2016, Mandic predicted that if there is no referendum on NATO membership, Montenegro will continue to have street protests and violent clashes. In this interview, Mandić said that during a meeting with Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin, he was promised that the pro-Russian forces in Montenegro "can count on Russia's support."
Konstantin Malofeev’s geo-commercial activities in Montenegro were restricted by Montenegro’s compliance with EU sanctions, which prevented him from traveling to the country. Nevertheless, during the Orthodox Easter celebrations in April 2015, he sponsored the torch to Montenegro and won the blessing of the Archbishop of Montenegro, Amfilohije. "If Malofeev committed a crime [in Ukraine], the torch would have saved him," Amfilohije said at the time. Malofiev once again supported the torch parade in 2016, this time also sponsoring DF's Andrija Mandic's Jerusalem tour.
Malofiev had previously used the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a cover and channel to prepare for the division of Crimea and the separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine. In January 2014, he sponsored the "Gift of the Magi" to be brought to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and received similar gratitude to Amfilohije. Malofiev dispatched his security chief, and then unknown former FSA colonel Igor Gilkin accompanied the gift to the parade from Kiev through Crimea to eastern Ukraine. During the parade, Gilkin turned into the "Separatist Commander-in-Chief Strelkov", and it was not until August 2014 that he successfully returned from a business trip.
The interaction between Malofeev and the Archbishop of Montenegro, Amfilohije, is also symbiotic. After blessing Malofiev, Amfolohije negotiated with him to sell him a television station in Montenegro. The metropolis has always been one of Montenegro's most outspoken anti-NATO and pro-Russian public figures, and has repeatedly called for the lifting of sanctions against Russia.
In view of his steadfast anti-Djukanovic and anti-NATO militants, on the evening of October 16, 2016, Archbishop Amfolohije called on the public not to gather in front of the parliament to protest the election results, but to stay in front of the parliament, which seemed counterintuitive. at home. This unexpected mildness even made Special Prosecutor Katnik thank Anfolohiye for his contribution to the peace of Montenegro in his statement of thwarting the coup d’etat.
It is worth noting that when Amfolohije publicly called for restraint, Dikic and Velimorovich were detained by the police, and Sindjelic and his handlers would know that the conspiracy had been revealed. Any further compliance with the previous violent protest plan will be futile and will become a burden for the organizers.
On November 28, Alexander Usovskiy sent a message to a nationalist contact, telling him
"The Poles who work with the Serbs are convinced that KV is behind the chaos in Montenegro... Malofiev is now completely in trouble-thanks to his Montenegrin friends"
Usovskiy's reference to "Poles who work with Serbs" seems to be related to an email he sent to RISS employee Nikolay Podchasikov two months ago. The email contained the names of two Serbian nationalists, including the Serbian Chetnik leader Zivkovic mentioned by Sinjelic in a Skype call. From the context of the news, these names seem to have been requested by Podchasikov’s boss and director of the RISS Balkan Office, Nikita Bondarev. Usovskiy wrote that the name of the Serb was provided by his Polish subcontractor Jacek Medrzycky, the organizer of the Polish anti-Ukrainian picket sponsored by Malofeev in 2014. Usovskiy further asked whether these were the "right Serbians", and if they were, he could "come for the party's money."
It is not clear what party Usovskiy is referring to.
In the months before the election, RISS has been deeply analyzing and commenting on the political situation in Montenegro. In February 2016, Nikita Bondarev predicted the post-election scenario, very similar to the planned chaos described in the confession of Sinjelic and Velimirovic: hordes of protests The protesters tried to rush into the parliament building, the police used rubber bullets to disperse them, while the protesters against Zhukanovic persisted. Bondarev further predicted a hypothesis that Djukanovic would lose the support of the European Union and NATO. However, in his words:
"The process of protests in Montenegro must enter different stages. Currently, we have seen peaceful protests, but they may escalate into similar to the Maidan incident in Kiev."
Bondarev further warned that the only way to ensure a peaceful settlement of the political tensions in Montenegro is for Zhukanovic's government to resign.
"The government should listen to public opinion and compromise so as not to cause unnecessary casualties and plunge the country into greater chaos."
General Reshetnikov, Chairman of RISS, had unscrupulously criticized PM Djukanovic in a joint event with Archbishop Amfolohije, calling this PM anti-Western rebellion on Montenegro if Djukanovic wins the elections"
General Reshetnikov and Archbishop Amfolohije, November 2014
On October 12, 2016, Bondarev and Reshetnikov hosted the "Ataman of the Balkan Cossack Army" in Moscow, a group of veterans from recent wars (including eastern Ukraine) Pro-Moscow Union. The alliance was established in Kotor, Montenegro a month ago, and according to its own description, it is a Russian paramilitary outpost in the Balkans. The "Supreme Ataman" of the army became Victor Zaplatin, the Balkan representative of the Donbass Volunteer League, and served as Igor Gill during his Serb volunteer in the Bosnian War from 1991 to 1992. Commander Kim. In November 2015, Zaplatin and Malofeev’s colleague Alexander Boroday established the Serbian branch of the “Donbass Volunteers Union” in Belgrade.
Reshetnikov (center) and Bondarev (left), host Serbia Chetnik and Donbass military commander Zaplatin (second from right)
Given that the so-called coup did not materialize, it is uncertain what role the "Balkan Cossack Army" intends to play in Montenegro’s post-election activities, and whether Usovsky represented RISS in September 2016 looking for Serbian nationalists and any such plans related. We tried to receive comments from RISS and have yet to get a reply.
A few days after the public disclosure of the failed coup and the withdrawal of Russian citizens from Belgrade, President Putin announced that Mikhail Fradkov would replace RISS Chairman Leonid Reshetnikov ( Leonid Reshetnikov). A source close to RISS confirmed to us that Reshetnikov will retire on his 70th birthday in February 2017. The decision to announce this change in early November 2016 seemed surprising, especially considering the facts of the former director Fradkov. The foreign intelligence agency had previously been appointed chairman of the Russian Railway Supervisory Committee.
Alexander Sytin, a former colleague of Reshetnikov who was fired in 2014 after making a statement criticizing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, told us that he believed that Reshetnikov’s role in Montenegro was one of the “theoreticians and consultants”:
“He is very close to Milosevic’s brother and widow. He has a huge network in the Balkans, mainly in Bulgaria and Greece, but he certainly has many connections with the “former” Yugoslav agents of his generation. In Ukraine, Moldova, Greece (he is an active supporter of Tsipras) the idea of provocatsyas is one of Reshetnikov’s favorite ideas. I think that in this case, the main communication [with the country] is not It was done in the way of RISS, but, for example, through the Security Council, where Reshetnikov is an adviser, and his own contacts in the presidential government. It is likely that he proposed the idea: organize a coup in Montenegro and may point out possible executors; if Not at the human level, at least at the level of pro-Russian organizations. Of course, the actual plan is made by others. Although he has been eager for a life of active service as a resident in Bulgaria and Greece, he cannot afford to act on his own. Activity"
Regarding our question, is it conceivable that the so-called coup may be a purely private plan-for example, Konstantin Malofeev (Konstantin Malofeev) used Leschetnikov’s without coordination with the Kremlin. On the Internet, Sytin dismissed: “No one dares to carry out international geopolitical activities without coordinating with the Kremlin. The Kremlin. Such actions will be severely punished.”
We tried to receive comments about the Montenegrin incident from Konstantin Malofeev and Gen. Reshetnikov, but still did not get a reply. When asked about Montenegro for the first time, Malofeev’s TV station Tsargrad and related media responded with a series of personal attacks on the author of this report.
On January 31, 2017, Putin met with Leonid Reshetnikov and thanked him for his work as the head of RISS.
"In the past 7 years, you have done a lot",
Putin said to Reshetnikov. The outgoing general responded:
"I want to say that over the years, we have done our best to implement and realize your foreign policy line. This has always been our cornerstone-Russia's line, our president's line."
Correction: An earlier version of the story mistranslated a word in the summary of the Skype call between Serbian political scientist Vencislav Bujic and Sindjelic. In fact, the latter asked Mr. Bujic for more "cash" instead of "arms." The translation in the embedded video is correct.
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