A 35-year-old Czech network engineer who is interested in military history, space and electric vehicles.

Written in collaboration with @SCW_Nuggie.

During the seven-year war, the Syrian rebels have been fighting an army that once had the sixth largest number of tanks in the world. This article will collect in detail the footage used by the Syrian Anti-Tank Missile (ATGM) and its impact on events during the Syrian civil war.

Abu Hamza comes from the 1st Coastal Division of the Free Syrian Army, operating TOW in early 2015. Known for his skills in operating BGM-71 TOW.

When the Syrian Civil War began, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) stockpiled a large number of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons in preparation for a war with Israel. These weapons and ammunition have been accumulated for decades and spread across many military bases in Syria. Although this protected them from potential Israeli pre-emptive strikes, many of these bases were untenable in the context of civil war. (For more information, the "Syrian Army: Combat Doctrine" report of the War Institute is a great resource.) Over time, the Syrian rebels have also acquired a large number of anti-tank weapons from sympathetic foreign countries.

When the Syrian Civil War began, most of the ATGM in SAA's arsenal came from Russia/Soviet Union. As SAA has historically been a conscription-based army, and as it continues to prepare for war with Israel, the insurgents immediately came into contact with the various ATGM trained personnel found in the SAA arsenal. The defection of active-duty soldiers has further increased this talent pool.

ATGM used during the Syrian civil war: NATO report name is mentioned in parentheses

On January 12, 2016, a 9K11 Malyutka in Khan Tuman, southern Aleppo province, Syria.

9K113 Konkurs missile system (launcher and missile) and 9M111M Faktoriya missile (standing) in the launch tube.

9K115 Metis in Idlib province, Syria, February 22, 2014.

Kornet is ready to launch on September 12, 2014 when the Mi-17 helicopter landed at Abu Dulhuor Air Force Base.

A TOW missile on display at the White Sands Missile Range Museum in the US Army Military Test Zone in New Mexico. The photos are from their website.

As most readers of Bellingcat may know, YouTube and other video and/or photo hosting sites removed countless footage related to the Syrian civil war as part of a broader effort to remove extremist content on their servers. Between the false positives and the malicious use of reported content by supporters of all parties in the Syrian civil war, this effort resulted in the permanent loss of many photos and videos.

Nevertheless, YouTube is still the main source of visual evidence collected for this database. The author archived footage of the Syrian civil war since the spring of 2015, focusing on recording the use of ATGM by the rebels.

Another important source of information is the page regularly updated by Twitter user @yarinah1, which contains descriptions and video links to rebel ATGM launches since the beginning of 2015.

All these and other sources have produced 105 GB worth of data archives in 3,971 files, 85% of which are more than 100 hours of war footage video.

The author would like to point out that monitoring ATGM firing based on visual evidence is much more difficult than calculating armored vehicle losses because the ATGM team is not always present. Videos recording ATGM launches were only released more frequently after the first TOW-2 was shipped, which may be due to its promotional value. This specific issue will be discussed later.

As mentioned above, this article only includes the ATGM launches of the Syrian rebel group, does not include the launches of the Syrian Democratic Forces and YPG, and does not include the launches of the so-called Islamic State (IS).

After discussing the methodology, the ATGM launches of the Syrian rebels on record are now introduced and discussed every year.

The undocumented ATGM launch in 2011 was probably due to the lack of advanced weapons in the early stage of the uprising.

On December 13, 2011, an opposition militant targeted a BMP equipped with RPG in Homs.

Although pro-government forces suffered the loss of 478 armored vehicles that year, ATGM footage in 2012 is still very rare. Although there are reports of ATGM use from time to time, in most cases, they lack visual evidence. According to the review of the 2012 battle video, before the establishment of a strong front line, the pro-government losses were mainly caused by the RPG, recoilless rifle and other unguided weapons used when the rebels occupied the pro-government positions or ambushed the army convoy. The total number of rebel ATGM launches visually confirmed in 2012 was only 9.

9M113 Konkurs in Raqqa Province, December 2012.

As the Syrian civil war developed into a more traditional conflict, the front line was clear, and anti-tank missiles became more important to the rebels. The rebels managed to obtain large amounts of ATGM by occupying government bases with large stockpiles of weapons, but the record of ATGM launches is still not standardized.

The following is an example of an anti-tank missile storage seized in the eastern Qalamoun area of ​​Damascus province, where the rebels acquired approximately 200 anti-tank missiles.

The total number of rebel ATGM launches visually confirmed in 2013 was 257.

In early 2014, there was a major change in the policies of the United States (US), allowing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to distribute TOW ATGM provided by US allies in the region to review Syrian rebel groups. As the United States tried to avoid the problem of transferring a large supply of weapons to a third party, they decided to require the preparation and launch of each ATGM supplied video. Only after providing these evidences will the rebels receive new missiles. Another decision is that the rebels will mainly acquire TOW 2A missiles (the rest are the former Soviet ATGM), which are powerful enough to destroy any armor in the Assad regime’s arsenal, without risking technology transfer to American enemies.

The US regulations on TOW launch footage make it easier to track the use of these ATGMs by rebels, because most groups have decided that since the video must be produced anyway, they also release it as a propaganda tool. Due to the popularity of these videos (some rebel groups and their TOW gunners are known for their skills), more other ATGM attacks have also begun to be filmed, even with locally purchased missiles.

As shown in the figure above, the number of TOW ATGM launched is gradually increasing-this is due to the gradual increase in the number of missiles provided by the United States and the increase in the number of trained TOW crews (the training itself took place in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that are friendly to the rebels).

The Harakat Hazzm organization first recorded the use of TOW ATGM by Syrian rebels on April 1, 2014.

For those interested in Syrian rebel groups (including information about authorized users of TOW ATGM), it is recommended to read the Bellingcat article "Syrian Opposition in the Syrian Civil War".

On December 15, 2014, opposition forces seized T-62 tanks at the Wadi Deif base in Idlib province.

The transportation of TOW ATGM helped the rebels strengthen their defenses weakened by the fierce fighting with ISIS. By the end of 2014, TOW had provided important assistance in taking over several government bases-the most famous being the Wadi Deif base in Idlib.

The total number of rebel ATGM launches visually confirmed in 2014 was 468.

In early 2015, the rebels formed a coalition of various ideological groups called Jaysh al Fatah, ranging from moderate FSA units to Jabhat al Nusra. This allows the rebels to combine resources and various specializations, thereby allowing the rebels to use joint weapons operations to initiate large-scale offensives in Idlib. TOW and other ATGM eliminated a large number of government tanks in exposed defensive positions and defeated the pro-Assad's usually tank-heavy counterattack, allowing rebel infantry and artillery to attack and maintain weak positions. At the beginning of the rebel offensive, government forces defended a fairly long and exposed protrusion, which allowed Jaysh al Fatah to effectively convert any pro-government movement within the protrusion into material and human losses.

Map of the territorial changes in Idlib province during the rebel offensive in the spring of 2015. The map is provided by Alhanuty via Wikipedia.

In late April, Jaysh al Fatah besieged about 250 pro-government troops at Jisr al Shughour Hospital, prompting Assad to appear on television, promising to lift the siege. Despite moving a large number of troops and heavy weapons (mainly from eastern Homs), all attempts to lift the siege failed and suffered heavy losses. Part of the failure can be attributed to the surrounding ATGM ideals-the towering forest hills above the plain expose any attempts by the government to advance to the ATGM team.

Admire the view of the Ghab Plain from the nearby hills. The villages of Ghaniyah, Kufayr, Frikka and Al-Sirmaniyah are clearly visible. Source: Eyad Alhosain.

When the pro-government forces were unable to break the siege and the defenders became desperate, they launched a breakthrough to their positions, and only 10-15% of the people survived.

Part of the pro-Assad forces’ response to Idlib’s failure was to withdraw their last half-decent force from eastern Homs. The Islamic State quickly took advantage of the enemy’s weak front line, using this to first launch localized attacks around Sukhna. Due to better-than-expected results, this local attack turned into an appropriate attack, leading to the rapid fall of Palmyra and its surrounding area.

At the end of the summer, although the pro-Assad army successfully defeated the FSA's southern front, they had long announced an offensive against Dara, but they consumed a lot of manpower and equipment on multiple fronts. Jaysh al Fatah not only seized the besieged Abu Duhul Air Force Base and made progress in Latakia, but also began preparations for a large-scale offensive aimed at capturing Hama Province. This will not only lead to a large loss of valuable territory, but will also approach the splitting of pro-government forces into three regions: Aleppo, Damascus, and the southern and coastal areas of Homs.

Soon after Jesh Fatah's victory in Idlib, Russia decided to intervene on behalf of Assad. Russia transferred dozens of planes and helicopters to Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia, while Iran transferred more and more military advisers and reinforcements from Iraq, Afghanistan and Hezbollah to Syria to stabilize the situation. Encouraged by this increase in support, SAA embarked on a major offensive in October 2015 to retake northern Hama and enter Idlib. This led to a major battle with the rebels who used about 140 ATGMs in the month alone, causing huge losses to pro-government armored forces and even some territories in northern Hama, especially the town of Morek. However, an increasing number of air and ground attacks forced the rebels to cancel their plans to launch an immediate attack on Hama.

Another important event worth noting was the offensive in southern Aleppo, where pro-government agents from Iran arrived in Ais. Many ATGMs are used against armored vehicles and soldier groups in an attempt to stop this attack.

The rebel positions in Latakia also experienced a large-scale government offensive in late 2015, during which the FSA First Coastal Division (known for its use of TOW) suffered heavy losses.

The total number of visually confirmed rebel ATGM launches in 2015 jumped to 637*.

* Around the time of the Jaysh al Fatah offensive in Idlib, pro-government online supporters began to report heavily on rebel YouTube channels (and other photo/video sharing sites), resulting in the deletion of many videos and entire channels. Since archiving since then, footage of the Syrian civil war is not common, and it is assumed that a disproportionate amount of combat footage has been lost. 

In 2016, thanks to Iran’s foreign reinforcements, Russian air support, and a small number of modern T-72 modifications and T-90 tanks, the Syrian government began to gain the upper hand in the Syrian civil war.

The pro-government offensive led to the massive use of ATGM by the rebels, especially near the city of Aleppo. The government forces first fought to reach the besieged pro-government towns Nubl and Zahraa, and then turned to cut off the rebel-controlled city of Aleppo from other rebel territory.

At the same time, the rebels launched an offensive to reclaim the territory that Iranian proxies had acquired in southern Aleppo since the end of 2015.

Soon after the pro-government forces besieged the part controlled by the Aleppo rebels, the rebels launched a large-scale attack on southern Aleppo, centered on the Aleppo Artillery Academy and surrounding urban areas. The offensive resulted in the lifting of the siege of the Aleppo rebels for several weeks, after which the regime managed to retake the area at a price.

A noteworthy incident occurred in early September 2016, when the rebels advanced in northern Hama (using the fact that pro-government forces withdrew a large number of troops from Hama to attack) the rebels approached Hama Air Force Base and TOW in Jesh The crew member al-Izza hit a pro-government Gazelle SA 342 helicopter while flying at low speed near the front line.

Video of SyAAF Gazelle being shot down by BGM-71 TOW pic.twitter.com/DKPYmREJjr

— BM-27 Uragan (@bm27_uragan) September 2, 2016

Around this time, the rebels received new Soviet ATGM models (mainly 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)) in addition to the TOW, which is now regularly transported.

Drone footage of the failed pro-government attack on the Artillery Academy held by Jaysh al-Fatah in southern Aleppo on August 28, 2016.

By the end of 2016, troops loyal to Assad had occupied all areas controlled by the rebels in Aleppo City. However, the fierce fighting in the past few months has caused heavy losses on both sides, and the use of ATGM by the rebels is crucial to thwart many pro-government attacks and delay their advancement. In high-intensity battles, sometimes the rebels use more than 10 ATGMs a day.

The T-90 tank was hit by TOW ATGM on February 26, 2016 in Sheikh Aqeel, northeast of Aleppo. The left side of the tank that was hit is not shown in this photo.

In these fierce battles, TOW 2A encountered for the first time the T-90 tanks provided by Russia to some pro-government units. This became the first government tank capable of withstanding a TOW 2A warhead, at least from some perspectives, and this has been proven in at least three cases. It can still operate despite being hit by a TOW anti-tank missile.

UAV footage of T-90 being destroyed or destroyed after being hit by TOW ATGM near El Eis in Aleppo province on May 10, 2016.

At the same time, poor training of pro-government forces and some luck resulted in two damaged T-90 tanks being captured (and subsequently used) by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. At least one T-90 was damaged or destroyed when TOW penetrated its side armor and was abandoned by its crew in an area that was later lost due to rebel advances. The other three tanks destroyed by TOW ATGM are suspected to be T-90s, but due to the distance from these vehicles, the identity cannot be determined. (T-90 is an evolution of T-72, so it is difficult to distinguish it from T-72 from a distance, unless the Shtora jammer can be seen).

The pro-government forces realized the impact of the rebellious ATGM on their armor and tried to create their own ATGM defeat device. In early 2016, the Sarab-1 (phantom) jammer was introduced on some pro-government-operated tanks (and rarely seen on other vehicles). Followed by Sarab-2 at the end of 2016 and Sarab-3 in 2017. All variants of the Sarab system are using powerful infrared lights in an attempt to disrupt the TOW ATGM guidance. This system is mostly ineffective because it cannot detect the incoming ATGM and cannot operate for a long period of time. Although launched 2 years ago, the Sarab system has not been widely deployed on pro-government tanks-most likely because of poor results.

One of the T-72M1s at Harastad, Damascus on January 29, 2018, was equipped with Sarab-2 APS and slatted armor T-72. Source: RT via Jason Jones.

Facts have proved that a more effective way to fight the rebel ATGM team is to deploy a large number of its own ATGM teams and have observers on the front lines where the rebels have active ATGM crews. For this reason, the pro-government mainly uses Kornet ATGM (5,500 meters vs. 3,750 meters), which has a longer range than TOW ATGM. This countermeasure caused the rebellious ATGM crew to suffer heavy losses in the past two years.

The total number of visually confirmed rebel ATGM launches increased to 655 in 2016.

After the loss of Aleppo at the end of 2016, many external nation-state supporters of the rebels basically gave up their material support for the Syrian rebels. At first, this caused a delay in transportation, but a few months later, the new US government decided to terminate the Timber Sycamore program-including the delivery of Tao missiles to Syrian rebels.

The FSA 1st Coastal Division is launching TOW ATGM.

As a result, the use of ATGM by the rebels dropped significantly in 2017. Coupled with the increase in internal fighting among the rebels, it is easier for government forces to advance in northern Hama Province and other areas. Any advancement previously required heavy material costs.

However, the rebels were still able to enter government-controlled territory, which they did in northern Hama in the spring of 2017, when the rebels were able to advance again in northern Hama. The rebels were able to maintain their gains, at least temporarily, until government forces transferred some of the remaining semi-decent troops, which, combined with RuAF's airstrikes, were able to retake the lost territory in the next few weeks. During the advancement of the rebels and the subsequent pro-government counter-offensive, the forces loyal to Assad again suffered heavy losses from the rebel ATGM.

The total number of visually confirmed rebel ATGM launches dropped to 226 in 2017.

At the beginning of 2018, as government forces gradually began to clear pockets controlled by the rebels and some areas in northern Hama and southern Idlib, the external calm on most fronts began to heat up.

Due to the deployment of Turkish troops between the rebel and government positions, the opportunities for both sides to further attack on the Idlib front were greatly restricted. The rebels now devote most of their energy to infighting, mainly between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (al Nusra) and Ahrar al-Sham. This involves using the remaining stock of ATGM against each other.

In the past, the rebels were able to capture ATGM from pro-government positions, but since this is almost impossible and the external supply of ATGM is stopped, we can expect that the use of ATGM by the rebels will be further reduced, as they are gradually consumed due to internal strife or Slow down inventory caused by pro-government offensives in various fields.

Due to the calm on the front line and the cessation of internal fighting, the number of ATGM used by the rebels in the second half of 2018 was very small.

The total number of visually confirmed rebel ATGM launches dropped to 64 in 2018.

At the beginning of 2019, the front line continued to maintain external calm (at this time all rebel pockets have been wiped out). When the high-intensity fighting resumed, the situation changed in late April. When this happened, regime forces began to advance slowly and expensively in northern Hama. As Turkey opposed the advancement of the regime but did not want to directly participate in the fighting, they restarted the delivery of ATGM to the rebels. Although some of these ATGMs are familiar TOW-2A, a large part of the new shipments is 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan), which is slightly more powerful than TOW-2A and has a longer range (Kornet is 5500 meters, while Kornet 3750 meters) TOW-2A). This did not stop the regime’s advancement, but increased costs for the regime’s advancement, and most of the fighting stopped again. 

At the same time, the regime (mainly the 4th Armored Division) also began a series of offensives, trying to advance the control of the rebels in the northeastern part of Latakia Province, with the main target being the hills around Cabana, dominating. The rugged terrain and stubborn defenders managed to prevent the regime from achieving its goals. Although ATGM was not commonly used in this battle (compared to the battle in northern Hama), they helped damage or destroy the armored bulldozers and tanks of multiple regimes that are using these armored bulldozers and tanks to clear the way The road to the location of the rebel fortress. This is the first completely failed regime offensive in several years. 

By December, the regime had transferred most of its forces to the main front lines in northern Hama and southern Idlib and began to advance there relatively quickly.

The total number of visually confirmed rebel ATGM launches in 2019 increased to 167.

At the beginning of 2020, the government vigorously promoted southern and southeastern Idlib and western Aleppo. By late February, the regime had successfully occupied approximately one-third of the territory controlled by the rebels. During this period, with the advancement of regime forces, ATGM traffic from Turkey increased. Although the rebels quickly lost territory, especially in southern Idlib, they used the supplied ATGM (and all the other weapons they still stocked) to cause heavy losses to the advancing regime units. As of late February (number from 2020.02.24), since the beginning of this month, the rebels had launched more ATGM than at any time since August 2016. The fighting basically stopped in early March, when Turkey and Russia agreed to a ceasefire and forced most of their allies to accept it.

The visually confirmed total number of rebel ATGM launches in 2020 has increased to 136.

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the number of visually confirmed rebel ATGM launches is currently 2,623. 

Summary and Analysis of Anti-tank Missiles Used by Rebels during the Syrian Civil War

Although tracking the use of ATGM by rebels during the Syrian civil war is more difficult than tracking the loss of pro-government armor that I described in the previous article (it is easier to track vehicle losses using hindsight lenses), we can still obtain important information by analyzing existing data.

Any ATGM type, with the exception of museum works like 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger), is likely to hit the target even if it is handled by actors from non-nation nations. According to the analysis of Tao strikes, the rebels’ hit rate reached 76%, 16.5% of the results were unknown, 6.5% of misses, and 1% of missiles failed during launch. They are likely to have achieved similar results when using other SACLOS (Semi-Automatic Line of Sight Command) ATGM, and the outdated MCLOS (Manual Line of Sight Command) ATGM may have a hit rate similar to 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger). -Numerical percentage.

Any armored vehicle on the modern battlefield should encounter powerful ATGM and RPG, if they do not have modern ERA or modern hard-kill active protection systems, such as Trophy APS, if their opponent is a nation-state, or even just a nation-state sponsored Capable militia.

The Syrian Arab Air Force’s air bases were repeatedly inadequate for defense preparations, leading to the use of ATGM by the rebels (and ISIS) against combat aircraft and helicopters

On November 16, 2013, the HJ-8 operated by Liwa al-Tawhid once targeted a government helicopter near the Nairab Air Force Base in Aleppo.

Flexible opponents will be happy to use ATGM for their unsuitable targets. If they do not urgently need to keep these ATGMs for armored vehicles, because even for warheads designed for armored vehicles, ATGM is also a very effective way to eliminate them like machine gun lairs and infantry. Targets such as cannons near the group or the front line.

Due to poor training and situational awareness or logistical issues, pro-Assad troops rarely use smoke to evade enemy fire. These units are also poor in combined arms operations, so their tanks are often exposed to enemy fire, and their tank armor is much weaker than frontal armor.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63ehKu7tYlY

When there is a lack of durable air frontline reconnaissance and accurate artillery or fast-available fighter jets, in many cases, the most practical way to defend against enemy ATGM is to deploy your own ATGM team and scouts.

The author would like to thank the following people for their valuable help, especially @MENA_Conflict, @oryxspioenkop, @QalaatAlMudiq, @adambrayne7, @SCW_Nuggie, @DLAMNscw, @Mr_Ghostly, and the entire Bellingcat investigation team. Finally, the author would like to thank the "SFM" team (you know who you are) for sharing working links to material that may be removed from the public website soon.

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